Accounting for informal trade modifies substantially the picture of regioanl trade, confirming that regional trade integration in West Africa is significantly underestimated in official trade data.
Introduction
Trade between African countries appears to be low, despite signicant eorts to promote regional trade. Most regional economic community agreements have had little success in raising trade between members above initially low levels. The share of intra-regional imports in total imports in the main regional trade agreements on the continent remained, by 2008, between 2 and 15 percent; by comparison, the share of intra-RTA trade worldwide, excluding the EU, was estimated at 35 percent in 2008 (De Melo and Tsikata, 2015) . This is often seen as evidence that borders in Africa have remained thick, despite tari reductions, due to persistent obstacles to trade such as non-tari measures and burdensome procedures at customs (WorldBank, 2012 ).
An assessment of regional trade in Africa cannot be complete, however, without including informal cross-border trade, a form of trade pervasive in many developing regions, and particularly in Africa (Golub, 2015) . The unrecorded ows of goods across borders represent a signicant share of international trade on the continent.
The low level of intra-African trade in ocial data is thus known to be due, to some extent, to the large share of transactions which this type of data fails to record.
One may expect that trade liberalization episodes should result in a reduction of informality; on the contrary, the persistence of informal trade might signal that some forms of trade impediments have remained high. But testing these hypotheses, and quantifying the link between trade barriers and informality, is generally out of reach due to the lack of data. This paper presents the rst quantitative study of informal cross-border trade, based on comprehensive data for one country. We use an original survey covering crossborder transactions at non-authorized locations on each land border of Benin, West Africa, to document the size and composition of informal trade ows. We match this data to customs data on legal trade for the same trade directions and period, and identify some of the determinants of informality in trade. We relate tari and non-tari barriers to the probability that a given product be traded informally rather than formally. We also identify product characteristics, such as perishability, which associate positively with informality.
A distinction must be made between two forms of informal trade.
1 Some trade goes unrecorded because of evasion at customs, using practices such as under-invoicing, misclassication, or mis-declarations. In parallel, some trade occurs outside of ocial border crossing points, avoiding customs entirely. We focus on the second form.
Case studies have suggested the importance in magnitude of this form of trade; we conrm this with our data. Despite the diculties inherent to collecting data on informal activities, our data oers a remarkably rich view of informal trade at Benin's borders. The ECENE survey (Enquête sur le commerce extérieur non enregistré) 1 Smuggling implies evasion from taxes or restrictions. In our context, some informal transactions qualify as smuggling, but an important share involves goods facing no duty in the country of destination. We therefore use the broader notion of informal trade to encompass all unrecorded transactions. was conducted by the National Institute of Statistics of Benin (INSAE) in 2011.
171 border crossing points were identied and surveyed; a total of 8,883 traders were interviewed, 10,415 single-product ows recorded. These crossing points are all distinct from ocial border points.
2
The case of Benin is particularly relevant for this issue. A small, poor country, it is a member of WAEMU 3 , a monetary and customs union of eight countries in West Africa. It shares land borders with three WAEMU members, Togo, Burkina-Faso and Niger (see gure1). This union has progressively dismantled internal taris and put in place a common external tari. Benin's fourth border is with Nigeria, the second-largest economy of the continent. Nigeria and Benin also share membership in a regional agreement, the ECOWAS 4 , larger than WAEMU but less advanced in terms of trade liberalization. As of 2011, the ECOWAS had not dismantled internal taris. Nigeria has a protectionist trade policy with high peaks, non-tari barriers and import bans; its currency is non convertible and chronically overvalued (IMF, 2017) .
Thus, Benin's borders oer a case study of trade liberalization eorts at dierent stages, and gives us the opportunity to examine their impact on the informality of trade. We focus on trade at Benin's two main land borders, with Togo and Nigeria; and consider regional trade, i.e. exports and imports at these two borders. 5 Figure 1 Map of Benin and its neighbours.
Our results shed new light on several aspects of the issue. First, we conrm the 2 Informal trade in our data is in legal products, i.e. this type of trade is illegal because it avoids customs, not because of the nature of the goods. 5 Informality plays also a prominent role in so-called entrepôt trade, i.e. imports from third countries which transit through Benin or Togo before being smuggled to Nigeria (see next section). As our focus is on regional integration, we largely leave this phenomenon out of the picture.
quantitative importance of informal trade in the region. In the case of trade with Nigeria, Benin's main trade partner, the informal to formal trade ratio is estimated at about 1 for imports, 5.1 for exports. Regional trade is thus signicantly larger in reality than in ocial trade data. Informal trade is not restricted to agricultural products. Industrial products make up more than half of informal imports from Nigeria in value. The overlap between products traded formally and informally is small: many products are traded exclusively on the informal channel, implying a reevaluation of export diversication in regional trade as well.
Second, we measure a positive and signicant semi-elasticity of trade informality to taris. Considering trade with Nigeria, raising the tari on a given product (at 6-digit level of classication) by 10 percentage points increases the probability that this product is traded informally, rather than formally, by about 0.12. Non-tari measures (sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, or SPS, and technical barriers to trade, or TBT) associate positively with informality. The ad-valorem tari equivalent of SPS measures is estimated at about 20%.
In the case of trade between Benin and Togo, formal trade data is aected by noise due to the parallel phenomenon of entrepôt trade (third-country imports transiting through Togo and Benin and smuggled into Nigeria). We show that such trade is prevalent in import data from Benin's customs.
6 Using Togo's customs data to circumvent this issue, we nd a positive relationship between WAEMU's external tari, and informality of trade between Togo and Benin. This is consistent with the view that important trade impediments remain despite the de jure removal of trade barriers; one reason for this could be the cost of origin certication. SPS and TBT also attract positive coecients, albeit lower than at the Nigeria border.
Third, we identify other determinants of informality beyond taris and non-tari barriers. Local unprocessed agricultural produce has long circulated across borders in the region without much control. The WAEMU and ECOWAS have in principle liberalized this trade between members.
7 We nd a high prevalence of informality for these products across all borders: they are essentially traded outside of customs.
Controlling for this category, we also nd that product perishability predicts trade informality, possibly due to lengthy procedures at customs.
8 These results suggest that, beyond taris and regulatory measures, the costs of compliance also contribute to the pervasiveness and persistence of trade informality. This paper contributes to the literature on trade integration and trade costs in Africa.
6 In other words, formal trade records contain third-country imports, labeled with WAEMU origin in order to benet from preferential treatment.
7 In the WAEMU, free movement applies to these products (article 10 of the treaty), with exemption from origin certication. A similar disposition is found in article 36 of ECOWAS' revised treaty, however applied tari data show that this was not yet applied by all countries in 2011. See next section for more details on this.
8 We also nd, in the case of trade with Togo, a positive impact for parts and components, another category of products likely to be time sensitive (Hummels and Schaur, 2013) . It shows that the low level of intra-regional trade, as well as the low product diversity in this trade (De Melo and Tsikata, 2015; Carrère, 2013) , are attributable in part to the incomplete coverage of ocial trade statistics. A common view is that trade is made too costly in the region by a combination of trade protections, lack of infrastructure, and red tape.
9 In part, the eect of such costs of trade is not to suppress trade, but to make it informal. So far, there has been no attempt to quantify this margin of trade creation (or formalization). We measure the impact of trade policy measures (taris and regulations) at this margin. Results are also consistent with trade facilitation (e.g. reduction in delays for clearing procedures) playing a role.
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A large literature has studied tax evasion in international trade, using mirror data, i.e. relying on data from the exporting country to identify missing ows in the importer's records (Bhagwati, 1964; Fisman and Wei, 2004; Javorcik and Narciso, 2008; Mishra et al., 2008; Bouet and Roy, 2012) . These papers focus on evasion at customs: products shipped through ocial borders (e.g. ports) with the payment of taxes and duties reduced or avoided by creative methods (underinvoicing, misclassication, etc.). Our focus is distinct: informal cross-border trade taking place on routes bypassing the ocial border points. The paper thus sheds light on a dierent form of evasion in trade which, if less studied, appears no less important in magnitude, in particular in Africa. Mirror data are of no help to study this, since trade ows are missing from both partners's records.
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Because of the lack of data, most existing studies on informal cross-border trade in Africa are qualitative and based on eld work, or case studies relying on indirect inference and accounting. Much of the literature has focused on smuggling in transit and re-exports, which has in some contexts reached impressive volumes of trade. This is the case at the border between Senegal and the Gambia (Golub and Mbaye, 2009 ). Golub (2012) focuses on this trade in Benin, Togo and Nigeria. Although this trade is larger in volume and has thus attracted much attention, we focus instead on informality in domestic trade, which has more direct implications for regional integration. Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah (1997) use similar data from direct border monitoring, between Kenya and Uganda, and show that informal trade at this border includes some re-exports but also large volumes of domestic trade, both in agricultural products and in manufactures (mostly from Kenya). Egg and Herrera (1998), Golub and Hansen-Lewis (2012) describe the role of trade networks, often based on kinship, in the organization of cross-border trade.
9 According to the Doing Business 2011 report, Sub-Saharan Africa is the world's most expensive region to trade within (WorldBank, 2011) . The same report shows that delays are up to three times as long in Sub-Saharan African compared with other regions of the World.
10 However, these results do not rule out the possibility that other factors, including articial colonial borders, or State weakness (Alesina et al., 2011) , may also contribute to the pervasiveness and persistence of informal trade.
11 Smuggling at customs is possibly present in our context too, but is not directly observed by us. We discuss how this is likely to aect our results in the empirical part.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section 2 gives elements of institutional context for the study. Section 3 describes the data sources, in particular on informal trade, in detail. Section 4 presents estimates of the volume and product composition of informal and formal trade, and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents a simple model that we use as basis for the empirical estimations. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Context: regional integration and trade in Benin's region
Regional agreements Benin is a founding member of the WAEMU, a customs union, along with three of its direct neighbors, Togo, Niger and Burkina-Faso, and four other countries. All eight countries are also members of the ECOWAS, a larger regional grouping which also includes Nigeria. The ECOWAS aims to promote economic integration but plays also a role in political cooperation and stability. Its stated objective is to create a regional common market.
The WAEMU being a customs union, goods should in principle freely circulate within it. Articles 4 and 77-81 of the WAEMU treaty dene free movement of goods as one of the pillars of community freedoms. This, however, does not apply in practice, and most products are subject to control at internal borders. Imported goods may face taxes at these customs, either because they have not WAEMU origin or no certicate for it; or because of remaining taris and restrictions.
12
The trade regime within WAEMU is closest to free circulation for local unprocessed products from agriculture, mining and shery.
13 A certicate of origin is not required for these products (Protocole additionnel N. III/2001, UEMOA/WAEMU). Such products have traditionally been traded on secondary roads (Egg and Herrera, 1998) , often not passing through ocial customs border posts. One reason for this may be that the cost of transport through ocial borders crossings may be too high for local producers selling in nearby markets across the border. Such ows are thus often seen as inherently informal; a tolerant policy towards them is also motivated by food policy concerns (Golub, 2015) . Given these specicities, we will control for local unprocessed goods in the empirical analysis.
Within WAEMU, industrial products are facing higher eective restrictions on movement, due in particular to stringent rules and administrative procedures to certify the origin of these goods (Ayuk and Kaboré, 2012; ITC, 2017) . Products originating outside the WAEMU space face a common external tari (CET), which has four tari bands: 0% (essential social goods), 5% (basic goods, raw materials, equipment goods, specic inputs), 10% (inputs and intermediate products) and 20% (nal consumption goods).
Within the ECOWAS (and thus, between Benin and Nigeria), trade in local unprocessed goods has also been liberalized since 1993, so these products are also, in 12 For example, a recent report by the International Trade Centre (ITC, 2017) based on a survey of rms in Benin states that In principle, regulations within WAEMU guarantee free movement of products of origin, with total exemption of customs taxes and duties. Yet, the survey reveals that customs taxes are applied de facto by member countries on imported products. Firms also complain of the lack of transparency regarding these taxes, and of the delays, cost and complexity of the procedure to obtain certicates of origin.
13 These include mineral products extracted from [member countries'] soil or deposited on the shore of the maritime coasts, live animals born within the community, harvested vegetable products, shery and hunting products, products extracted from the sea by boats registered in a member state, products from live animals that are reared in a member state (WAEMU treaty).
principle, circulating freely between members.
14 However such provisions are often not applied within the ECOWAS (UNECA, 2010; ITC, 2017) . This is conrmed by the level of applied tari reported by ECOWAS countries to the ITC in 2011, which was not zero for these products. Nigeria's trade policy has long been highly protectionist, with most-favored-nation (MFN) taris reaching 35%, a list of import prohibitions on more than 25 groups of items, as well as other numerous other forms of non-tari barriers and price distortions. it has attracted most of the attention in the literature so far (Igue and Soule, 1992; Raballand and Mjekiqi, 2010; Golub, 2012) . The main features of this trade have been documented in these studies: trade concentrates in a few products facing high taris or import bans in Nigeria, such as rice, palm oil, textile, and used cars; smuggled volumes can be estimated from large discrepancies between e.g. Benin's ocial imports and consumption gures for such goods. Such transit activities have become an important part of Benin's and, to a smaller extent, Togo's economy, and these two countries compete in taxes and in the quality of their port and transshipment infrastructures to attract this trade.
In this paper, we focus instead on informality of trade in locally produced goods. This question has attracted comparatively less attention, despite its relevance for regional integration. We therefore consider exports and imports (i.e. trade in domestic products), and exclude re-export and transit ows. Data from the ECENE survey, which records these four types of ows, shows that informal trade at Benin's borders is far from being restricted to entrepôt trade. For example, in the case of imports from Nigeria into Benin, the ratio of informal to formal trade in value is close to 1.
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These imports include agricultural and industrial products, which Nigeria exports to Benin and the WAEMU zone. This implies that a large share of regional trade fails to be measured in ocial data; raising the question of what explains such a prevalence of informality. Thus, trade informality needs to be taken into account in a discussion of the issue of regional integration in Africa.
14 Article 36 of the revised treaty. Trade ows are classied as exports, imports, re-exports and transit. The latter two categories correspond to ows of goods originating in third countries (typically in Asia or Europe), which enter Benin (possibly legally) before crossing one of Benin's land borders to reach one of the neighboring countries. In this article, we focus on regional trade; therefore we ignore this so-called entrepôt trade (re-exports and transit ows).
18 We present results on imports and exports of Benin with its direct neighbours.
Questions may arise on the quality of the data, given the peculiar nature of the survey. One may ask why illegal traders should accept to answer a survey conducted by public agents (surveyors and supervisors from the INSAE). The diculties faced in the conduct of the survey are explained in detail in the report published by the INSAE (INSAE, 2011) . In particular, the report explains that the survey was conducted in cooperation with the Customs administration.
19
17 Note that a few non-border districts have a survey point: this is due to trade done on rivers and lakes, such as lake Nokoué at Abomey Calavi close to the coast.
18 See Golub (2012) for an account of entrepôt trade. The number of questionnaires lled suggests that the conditions were indeed met to allow the survey to be collected in good conditions. 20 This, however, does not eliminate the concern of selection. Some products may be less likely to appear in the survey: in particular, products facing more restrictions may be traded at night, or people trading them may be more reluctant to answer questions. As will be discussed in the results section, this creates a potential underestimation of our coecients of interest.
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The data also appears to be consistent: the number of wrong product codes is low; distributions of unit values by product have non excessive levels of dispersion. Products appearing most frequently, and the direction of their trade, are those expected based on existing studies on informal trade in the area.
The second source of data are ocial trade records from Benin's and Togo's customs.
Data are provided at the 8-digit level of the WAEMU's own classication (close to the HS system), on a monthly and bilateral basis. We use Benin's customs as the data source for Benin's exports, and for its imports from Nigeria. In the case of imports from Togo, we rely instead on mirror data, i.e. Togo's records of these trade ows (its exports to Benin). This is because, as we will show, Benin's data clearly overestimate this trade. The total value of trade from Togo to Benin is more than four times higher in Benin's than in Togo's records. Our analysis of the gap between the two sources shows that it is probably due to third-country imports transiting through Togo, falsely declared of Togolese origin in order to benet from tari exemption. Therefore, we use the more reliable data from Togo for these ows.
Formal trade data on the four bilateral trade ows (imports and exports, to and from Nigeria and Togo) are matched with the corresponding informal ows.
21 To match the informal and formal trade sources, we aggregate trade ows at the 6-digit level of the harmonized system (HS-6). This reduces the risk of product misclassication, and makes data compatible with other data such as the tari data, also at HS-6 level.
Our variable of interest is the trading mode -formal or informal -for each product traded between Benin and one border country. We use two methods for measuring informality of trade. One is to estimate the share of informal trade in total trade of each product:
where X f orm ic is the total value of formal trade (exports or imports) of product i to/from country c reported in customs data for September 2011. X inf ic is the total value of informal trade recorded in ECENE for the same product and country, extrapolated to a monthly value (i.e. multiplied by 31/10).
There is a clear risk of measurement error in traded values; the short sampling period of ECENE is one reason to be concerned about this. Using monthly formal trade data, the highest frequency available, reduces this issue without eliminating it. Other sources of measurement error may exist in both trade data sources.
To address this issue, one possible alternative is to ignore data on values traded, and to code a product as 1 if it appears in the ECENE survey; 0 if it only appears in ocial trade records. We label this binary variable entry to informality. This may be more reliable if we believe that our data sources will generally capture the presence of trade of a given product correctly, without always measuring the volume 21 Since we focus on trade of local products, we use origin, and not provenance, in both trade data.
Thus, imports mentioning Nigeria as origin are kept in our database, but imports with Nigeria as provenance (and a third country as origin) are not.
or value precisely. We will experiment with both methods in the empirical analysis.
Trade policy data
Data on applied bilateral taris from the ITC are used to measure applied protection of Benin and Nigeria.
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We also use data from the WAEMU on the common external tari (CET) applying at the external borders of the union. In the case of trade between Togo and Benin, taris are in principle absent. However, we use the CET data to test for the possibility that some products may face this tari rate if they fail to have their origin certied.
These data are averaged at the 6-digit level; there is little variation in tari rates at 8-digit lines.
To identify unprocessed goods with tari exemption, we use the denition in the WAEMU treaty for this category that we directly map with the 6 digit HS products in our database. We verify that production of the good is positive in the country of interest, and that applied taris for these products, as reported by the WAEMU in ITC data, are zero within the union. In table 1, we compare these estimates with monthly trade values from national customs data. Both sources are subject to measurement and sampling errors, but provide an indication of orders of magnitudes. Table 1 shows that the larger informal trade volumes are with Nigeria. Petroleum products account for 90% of Benin's informal imports from Nigeria: our data captures this large smuggling operation due to highly subsidized prices in Nigeria, causing 25 The classication of perishability is based on the costs to maintain temperature and humidity conditions during transport, including expenses incurred during delivery. This is similar to the denition provided, for example, by IATA in their perishable cargo regulations.
26 The borders with Burkina-Faso and Niger are much shorter, and the survey included only 1 and 2 border crossing points, respectively, with these countries.
strong price disparities between the two countries (LARES, 2005) . This is reassuring on the capacity of the survey to accurately measure informal transactions, including those facing strong repression in Benin and Nigeria, and thus to reect the reality of informal trade. We nevertheless exclude this trade products from the rest of our analysis due to its specic determinants. Excluding petroleum products, the ratio of informal to formal trade in imports from Nigeria is close to 1. Nigeria has long been a supplier to WAEMU countries of a large variety of agricultural and manufacturing products (Egg and Herrera, 1998) . In some cases, avoiding import duties make these products competitive with respect to third country imports.
In the case of imports from Togo, we need to carefully distinguish between actual imports, and re-exports, i.e. third-country imports being transshipped through Togo 28 Using this data, the ratio of informal to formal trade for these ows is estimated at 0.18, lower than in the case of imports from Nigeria. This may be due to the fact that trade liberalization is more advanced within WAEMU. We will discuss further this point in the light of our empirical results.
In the case of exports, the ratio of informal to formal trade is estimated at 5.1 for Nigeria and 2 for Togo, implying that ocial trade data signicantly underestimate the volume of trade to both destinations. Benin's exports are predominantly to Nigeria, reecting this market's size.
Overall, these gures conrm that that the actual level of regional trade in the area is signicantly underestimated in formal trade data. transportation equipment (parts and accessories of motorcycles) and textile (woven fabrics of cotton).
Traditional agricultural products are more predominant in imports from Togo. These include vegetable products (maize, oils, our, manioc, rice), and cattle. The main non-agricultural item in informal imports is cement, of which Togo is a large producer.
Informal exports exhibit a higher concentration, and are dominated by traditional agriculture products (cattle,vegetable products) and wood. This reects the structure of Benin's economy. Products facing protection in Nigeria feature predominantly in informal exports to this country: this includes vegetable oil and cement, under import bans in Nigeria; as well as rice, tomatoes and manioc our, which face high taris and levies. This suggests that informal and formal trade are two distinct channels of trade, with a specialization of trade by product. This feature motivates our analysis, which will investigate the determinants of trade channel at the product level.
It also implies that accounting for informal trade ows substantially modies the picture of regional trade, not only in aggregate volumes but also in product diversity.
This contributes to the discussion on the low diversication of exports of sub-saharan African countries. Carrère (2013) shows that the high concentration of exports of West African countries (as measured by Theil index values), masks an important diversication at the extensive margin. She also nds that, if most WAEMU countries exhibit a high concentration of exports relative to their income level, their exports within the zone are signicantly more diversied than their extra-regional exports. An interpretation is that lower trade costs within the region, due to trade liberalization, as well as distance and common language, allow for a higher export growth at the extensive margin, with some experimentation in new products taking place towards close markets. Our results reinforce this view. True product diversity is likely to be signicantly higher than apparent in ocial trade data. Moreover, it is possible that some of the growth at the extensive margin observed within regional agreements occurs by formalization of informal trade ows, made possible by the lowering of trade costs. and Togo, we use the common external tari (CET) of the WAEMU as potential determinant in the model. Imports and exports between the two countries should in principle face no tari at this internal border of the zone. However, some trade ows may be applied the common external tari (CET) of the zone, because the origin certication is costly to obtain.
Our data conrm that local unprocessed goods are essentially traded informally in the region. This may be due to the higher transport costs associated with using authorized routes rather than informal ones, for local producers selling to markets nearby. For example, the survey shows that at least 171 distinct informal border crossings existed at the time of the survey, while Benin's code des Douanes lists about 30 authorized roads for import at all land borders. A tolerant policy toward these trade ows may also contribute to this.
Non-tari measures, such as SPS and TBT, appear to be associated with informal trade. This is true also of perishable products, possibly due to time sensitiveness of these products. In contrast, dierentiated products, as well as parts and components, are more likely to appear in formal trade records. In this section we build a simple model, which will serve as the basis for the empirical exercise. We consider rms trading goods across one of Benin's land borders. We take the example of imports from Nigeria into Benin; the same logic applies to imports from/exports to the other countries, which will be considered in the empirical exercise.
Each trading rm (or trader) faces the choice of trading formally or informally.
In the context of this paper, formal trade means crossing the border through one of the ocial land border crossings where customs operate, and having the shipment registered by the custom agents. Informal trade means crossing the border anywhere outside from the ocial crossings, so that the shipments are not recorded by customs and not subject to controls and duties.
29 Informal crossings are more numerous than formal ones.
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The formal and informal routes are two ways to move goods across the border, which dier in expected duration, cost and risk. We assume that trading costs for formal/informal trade are independent: i.e. shipping some goods formally has no impact on costs faced by the rm faced for informal shipments.
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Cost of time: we denote i a parameter capturing the impact of delays on the value of a product i (e.g. its perishability). We model this cost of time as an iceberg cost: if shipping time is ST , then one needs to ship 1 + i :ST units of good so that 1 unit arrives at destination. (Expected) shipping times on the formal and informal routes are noted ST F and ST I respectively, and these values are assumed to be known ex ante by the traders.
Monetary costs: crossing an ocial custom point involves paying the tari T i on the goods. Most taris considered here are ad-valorem : T i is expressed as percentage of shipment value. We ignore the possibility of underdeclaring/smuggling so that taris paid at the custom would be lower than the ocial duty T i .
On the informal route, monetary costs also apply, which we assume may depend on the tari faced on the good : g(T i) is the ad-valorem equivalent of these costs, we expect g H > 0. This may represent bribes paid to custom agents to reduce the risk of a control. One possibility is that a bribe has to be paid in order to ensure that no control will be applied to one's shipment (e.g. custom agents will not be sent to the 29 Smuggling and tari evasion taking place at the customs, through misclassication or underinvoicing, is not considered here. We discuss in the next section how the empirical results could be aected by it.
30 For the purpose of the ECENE survey, 171 such crossings were identied and included in the sampling frame; while Benin's code des Douanes lists about 30 authorized roads for import.
31 This is dierent from the hypothesis made in e.g. Pitt (1981) . In our case, products tend to be traded either informally, or formally, rarely both (see section 4): this is one reason for not using such an hypothesis.
informal crossing point to block one's shipment). In the case of rent sharing between the payer and the receiver of the bribe, we expect to have g(T i ) T i (collusive corruption in the terminology of Sequeira and Djankov (2014) ). Alternatively, it may be the case that custom agents are in position to extract a bribe larger than the tari from traders : g(T i) ! T i (coercive corruption in Sequeira and Djankov (2014) Nigeria and Benin. We will relax this assumption later on.
Traders minimize trading costs. Therefore, a trader chooses the informal route if:
The probability of a trader of good i going informal then writes
P [Inf ormal i ] = G( i (ST F ST I ) + T i g(T i )) (3)
This equation shows that the probability, for a trader of a good i, to choose informality increases with the tari T i if g H < 1,that is, if the tari increases more the costs of formal than of informal trade. We see this as the most likely case. The probability also increases with i if ST F ST I > 0. So, if formal trade is slower than informal trade, then we expect informal trade to be more frequent for time-sensitive products, e.g. perishable products, all else equal.
Aggregating traders To go from the individual probability in equation 3, to the informal share of trade by product, let us assume a number N of traders operating in sector i, who draw independent costs v from the same distribution. The share of traders going informal, in sector i, then follows a binomial distribution with individual probability p = G(D i ), with D i = i (ST F ST I ) + T i g(T i ). p is the expected value of the share of traders going informal. With traders of identical size, this is equal to the value share of informal trade in total trade of good i, X i nf i
As explained in section 3, we may want to work instead with a binary variable, an indicator for informal trade, rather than with the informal share of trade. This avoids using trade values in the formal and informal channel, X F i and X Inf i , which are subject to measurement and sampling errors. We show in section 3 that only a minority of products appear in both formal and informal trade data: the informal/formal share is at 0 or 1 for most products, so that a binary model applies naturally to the data.
Let us consider the probability 32 that a product is traded informally, X inf i > 0. Under the same assumption of a market of N traders of identical size for good i, this probability, for good i is given by:
G(D i ) is, as before, the probability that an individual trader chooses informality.
Zero informal trade implies that all traders go formal, which with independent draws
Assuming a logistic form for G, the probability of informal trade can be written as:
A rst case to consider is N = 1, i.e. a monopoly in good i's trade. Then, the above probability is given by G(D i ). With G logistic, we obtain a logit model.
Parameter N is dicult for us to evaluate, but likely to be greater than one for many products. For example, we observe, in ECENE data for informal ows, numerous shipments of the same good at dierent points (on the same border), which suggests the presence of several (independent) traders.
With N > 1, the probability function h N is steeper. Without certain information regarding the functional form, we will, in the empirical exercise, rely on linear and logit functions. 
The second equation corresponds to the case where only informal trade is protable.
Note that, as before, we consider only products for which there is trade of at least one type, so that the informal share of trade is dened.
In binary model form, the probability of informal trade (conditional on being traded)
can be expressed by:
Thus, at low tari levels, this probability follows the same function as in equation 5; above a threshold value, the probability goes to 1.
Econometric specication
Equation 4 species our main specication as a fractional response model. We estimate it as a generalized linear model (GLM) which can be estimated with a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, as in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . We will employ this estimator with a logistic function for G. 33 X i is a vector of product characteristics (perishability; an indicator for unprocessed goods, for dierentiated products and for parts and components).
The model is estimated on the sample of products traded in September 2011 (i.e.
products appearing in at least one of the formal and informal trade records). The ECENE survey covers a 10-day period in that month; we match this data with monthly customs data for September. The dependent variable is the informal share of trade as estimated in the data.
Alternatively, we rely on the binary form of the model (equation 5), to exploit only information on the presence of each product in formal/informal trade, and not the value or volume traded, subject to caution.
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Our preferred specication in this case is a linear probability model:
We estimate this model by OLS on the sample with the dependent variable taking the value of 1 if we observe informal trade of product i (dened at HS-6 level) with country c, 0 otherwise. X i and Z ic are dened as above.
The linear form is intended to approximate for function h N in equation 6. The aim is to estimate the slope of the informality curve, with respect to taris and other determinants. We will also employ logit models as an alternative functional form.
Overall, results on the marginal eects of taris and other determinants, on informality of trade, are highly consistent across GLM, linear, and logit models.
In the case where formal trade is not always protable, the model is identied by Estimation issues A rst issue to consider is selection into the sample, in particular for informal products. Our data source for these is the ECENE survey, which possibly fails to measure all informally traded products in the period considered. This can be an issue if this sampling selection is non-random. The main concern is that products facing higher protection could be harder to observe: these may be traded at night, 33 Taris will be introduced in log form, log(1 + t) with t the ad-valorem duty, in order to allow for non-linearities in the g function. Results are similar when using taris in levels.
34 Errors in product codes are rare in ECENE data, suggesting that misclassication of products by surveyors is minimal. Therefore we think the information on the presence of products in informal trade reliable even if the estimated traded value might not. or on routes not covered by the surveyors; traders of such products may be more reluctant to answer to surveyors. If these products are facing higher taris (i.e. if there is a correlation between taris and unobserved determinants of informality, such as other restrictions on trade), then this could imply an underestimation of the impact of taris on informality. In that case, our coecient estimate may represent a lower bound of the true impact.
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A related concern is selection on formally traded products. Evasion at customs, by way of underinvoicing or misclassication, has been studied in e.g. Fisman and Wei (2004) ; Javorcik and Narciso (2008); Mishra et al. (2008) . This is distinct from the type of informal trade we consider, which avoids customs; the two may coexist. In the case of underinvoicing, products should still appear in our binary specication (in which each product traded is coded with a binary value); but they would be incorrectly coded as formal trade (since they appear in customs trade records), despite the fact that part of the trade has been smuggled. Some products may also be missing altogether.
We view this type of evasion as distinct from our focus. Our results may be aected, if there is some substitution between the two forms of evasion. For example, if underinvoicing at customs is present, then some high-tari products will appear as formal in our sample (being recorded at customs), causing a downward bias of the tari coecient. In the results section, we show evidence of misclassication for imports from Togo, some products being traded at customs with a fake WAEMU origin. We address this issue by using mirror data, but we cannot be sure to eliminate it completely. One could wish to estimate the elasticity of all forms of evasion to trade barriers, but our data does not allow us to estimate this parameter.
35 Note however, that one of the trades facing strongest repression is the smuggling of petroleum products from Nigeria, which is abundantly recorded in our survey data. This selection issue thus seems not as important as one could fear.
Estimation results

Results: imports from Nigeria
We rst present estimations using the sample of imports from Nigeria. Table 5 shows results from a linear probability model, excluding oil products.
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We rst estimate the impact of taris and non-tari measures (SPS and TBT) separately (column 1 and 2), then include sequentially product characteristics: dummy variables for perishability, dierentiated goods, and parts and components.
The tari level applied by Benin on imports from Nigeria has a positive and signicant impact on the probability of observing informal trade of a given product, across all specications, with a coecient of about 1.2. This implies that raising the tari on one product by 10 percentage points increases the probability that this product be traded informally, rather than formally, by about 0.12.
SPS measures and TBT
also have a signicant and positive impact on informality of trade. The ad-valorem equivalent of an SPS is estimated at 21% (column 5).
Perishable products are more likely to be traded informally. Note however that the sample contains only 10 such products, all traded informally. We thus need to view this coecient with some caution. We do not nd any signicant eect for dierentiated goods, and parts and components.
We control for unprocessed goods across all specications. Our results conrm that these products are, for the most part, crossing borders at non ocial crossing points, despite their de jure liberalization.
38 This may reect higher costs of trading on authorized routes, for producers selling in markets at short distance across the border. It is also in line with the view that some trade in these products takes place on traditional routes across borders, reecting the articial nature of some national borders in the region. (Golub, 2015) . Table 6 we report marginal eects from two alternative models: a logit model, with informality as the dependent variable (columns 1-3); and a generalized linear model (GLM) with the share of informal trade (in total trade of a product) as the dependent variable (columns 4-6).
Alternative functional forms In
Overall, results are in line with the previous specications. The marginal impact of the tari variable on the probability of informal trade is similar, estimated at 1.3 with the logit model, 1 in GLM.
36 Note that oil products represent a large share of value traded, but our product-level specications are little aected by this dominance. Including oil products (two product codes) does not aect the results signicantly. 37 In our specication the marginal impact of a tari raise is given by dP = dT 1+T
, we take the value of the impact at the mean value of taris.
38 Free movement should apply to unprocessed local goods within ECOWAS, according to its treaty, but applied tari data between these countries were not at zero in data reported to the ITC in 2011.
See section 3. We also experimented with alternative specications to check the robustness of the results. One alternative is to test the sensitivity of results to the presence of some products in both trade channels, formal and informal. We dropped these products and estimated a logit model: results are similar to those presented here. We also tried labeling such products as formal instead of informal, in binary response models, i.e.
looking at the exit of formality margin, instead of the entry into informality. Finally, we estimated linear models on the informal share, as an alternative to GLM. Overall, the results are consistent with those presented here. These results are available on request.
Tari revenue implications One may ask about the implications of these coecient values in terms of tari revenues: that is, on what side of the Laer curve does Benin (or the WAEMU) nd itself ? Answering this question requires to take into account the particular feature of our setting that many products appear to be traded only informally. Thus, no tari is raised on these products. By contrast, many products are traded exclusively on the formal channel: for these products, our coecient implies a positive relationship between tari and revenue: increasing taris on these products would raise informality but not so much as to decrease tari revenue. Details of the calculation are provided in the appendix. One has to note that we do not take into account evasion practices taking place at customs, such as under-invoicing Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are clustered at the HS4 level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Marginal eects. Sample includes all HS-6 products appearing in formal or informal trade records for Benin's imports from Nigeria and Togo in September 2011, excluding petroleum products. SPS measures, TBT (technical barriers to trade): 1 if importing country applies a SPS or TBT measure on one HS-8 product line within the HS-6 code.
or misclassication, which could modify this conclusion. This, however, raises the possibility that trade liberalization, in contexts similar to the region considered here, may not be costless to governments. On the other hand, there is also some trade in regional products taking place at the Togo-Benin border. We are primarily interested in this form of trade. The two countries being members of the WAEMU custom union, one could expect that this border should be relatively frictionless, which could favor formality of trade. However, barriers to trade are not absent. One reason is that free movement of goods does not apply within the WAEMU: imports from outside the union are required to clear customs also at internal borders. In addition, internal trade ows may face duties because they lack a certication of origin, which may be costly to obtain.
Our problem is therefore to distinguish between the two forms of trade in the data.
As shown in section 3, the volume of ocial imports as recorded by Benin raises suspicion about this data: a possibility is that some of these ows declare Togo as origin to benet from WAEMU treatment, while being in reality imports from outside the union. This led us to the conclusion that Togo's records of the same ows (that is, the so-called mirror data) are more accurate.
We examine this hypothesis more precisely now. In 2011, the value of all imports from Togo in Benin, as reported by Benin's customs, was FCFA 125.8 billion. The corresponding number in Togo's records (i.e. exports to Benin) was FCFA 46.3 billion. The Benin data records 818 distinct 6-digit products, Togo only 106; of these, 86 are in common in the two datasets.
What explains the gap? Incentives to declare goods dier at the Beninese and Togolese customs. When entering Benin, products of WAEMU origin benet from tari exemption. Therefore, there exists an incentive to misclassify products from outside the WAEMU zone as Togolese products. On the contrary, the same products are not facing a tax when leaving Togo. Moreover, for goods imported from third countries, such as China, transiting through Togo and Benin to reach Nigeria's markets (i.e., entrepôt trade), the trader's best interest is to use Togo's transit regime, which entails a lower tax rate than for goods declared for domestic use (which have to pay the external tari ).
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39 One could ask why traders would not then use also the transit regime in Benin. One possibility is that goods banned for import in Nigeria cannot be declared in transit to this country, leaving import Therefore, we hypothesize that entrepôt trade ows through Togo could appear in Benin's import data but not in Togo's export data (since transit are not recorded in customs data for exports and imports); that the gap between the two sources is largely attributable to entrepôt trade; and that Togo's export data are thus a more reliable measure of actual exports to Benin. We now present evidence in support of this hypothesis. Table 7 shows the number of products, at 6-digit level, appearing in Benin's and Togo's records as imports from Togo to Benin in 2011. We ask whether these products also appear in Togo's records of exports to other destinations: all world countries excluding Benin, Nigeria and Niger. This should measure actual exports of Togo, since entrepôt trade is a phenomenon specic to trade with these three countries. In total, Togo exports 272 products to all other destinations, for a total value of FCFA 242.4 billion. Among the 818 products declared as imports by Benin, less than 20% also appear as Togo's exports to other countries. By contrast, Togo's data on exports to Benin appear much more consistent: 3 quarters of the products are also found in other exports.
This is in line with our hypothesis: if Benin's customs record ows that are actually entrepôt trade, i.e. third-country imports sent mostly to the Nigeria's market, then it explains why these products are not connected to Togo's export specialization. A further test is to look at the relation between these trade ows and Nigeria's trade barriers. In table 8, we regress the probability that a given product appears in Benin's customs records, or in Togo's, on the level of taris and the presence of import bans in Nigeria for that product.
These results show a strong relation between products reported as imports from Togo in Benin's customs data, and trade protection in Nigeria: a product under a ban in Nigeria is more likely to appear in this data, by about 34 percentage points; a tari hike by 10 percentage points increases this probability by 8 points. This relation is much less pronounced for products declared by Togo, although a positive link with the tari is present. Columns 3,4 conrm these results when focusing on products which appear only in one of the records. In column 5, we estimate a model of the mirror gap, similar to those used in the literature (e.g. Fisman and Wei (2004) ): the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of trade values declared by Benin and Togo, for domestic use as the only option; or that the WAEMU tari for a product is low so that it makes little dierence. Golub (2012) shows that some entrepot trade is declared in Benin for domestic use and discusses possible explanations. Dependent variable is 1 if product appears in Benin's customs data (1 and 3) or in Togo's customs data (col. 2 and 4). Col. 5: OLS on the log of the ratio Benin data over Togo data, by product. Sample includes all HS-6 products (revision 3), col. 1-4, or all products common to both samples (col. 5).
for the same product. Among products appearing in both sources, this gap is larger for products under a ban. Overall, these results show that the mismatch between the two data sources is strongly related to Nigeria's trade barriers, which predict the discrepancy at the intensive and extensive margins.
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These results conrm that, to measure Togo's exports to Benin, the exporter's data are more reliable than the importer's. In the next section we estimate the model of informality of trade at the Togo-Benin border, using Togo's customs data.
Determinants of informality in imports from Togo
Results of our model of trade mode choice for imports from Togo are presented in table 9. Togo and Benin are members of the WAEMU customs union, which implies the dismantlement of internal barriers to trade. However, evidence suggests that some obstacles remain in practice. One reason is that certication of origin may be costly to obtain. The problem of entrepôt trade may worsen this: as customs ocers may be suspicious regarding the origin of products, and prone to refuse preferential treatment in case of doubt. As a result, there is a possibility that some of Togo's exports face WAEMU's common external tari (CET), since products without proper origin certication are required to pay this tari. To test for this, we include the CET in the model. We also include binary variables for non-tari measures (SPS measures and TBT), as well as indicators for product characteristics. In addition,
we try including measures of Nigeria's protection in the model. The reason for this is the following: the previous section has shown that some of the products in Togo's exports to Benin are actually transit trade (third-country imports intended for Nigeria's market). We try to mitigate this problem by using Togo's records instead 40 Note that, in the literature, such as Fisman and Wei (2004) , the relationship is generally in the other direction: importer's data are lower than the exporter's, which is attributed to underinvoiving or smuggling at the importer's customs. This diers in our setting due to the specicity of entrepôt trade, generating dierent incentives for traders.
of Benin's: but some of these products may still be present (as results in table 8 41 In the ECENE survey, transit and re-exports are recorded separately in two categories which we exclude from our sample. 42 Results from logit and GLM estimations are similar.
Note that the share of informal trade is higher for exports to Nigeria than to Togo (table 1) . This may be due to a lower level of trade impediments at the Togo border, which is an internal border within the WAEMU. This is however a hypothesis which we cannot test precisely due to data limitations.
42 In unreported results, we built a sample with formal trade data for a 3-month or yearly period, combined with the same ECENE data for informal trade. Results are more signicant, and the tari and ban variables have expected signs. However these results are problematic as the period coverage between the two sources diers widely, creating potential issues due to selection and seasonality. We therefore decided not to retain them.
Conclusion
The recorded level of regional trade is low overall, in sub-saharan Africa; even in customs unions, such as the WAEMU, or the ECCAS (CEMAC), trade performance is generally seen as disappointing (Carrère, 2013 We start by estimating the magnitude of informal ows. We show that accounting for informal trade modies substantially the picture of regional trade, conrming that regional trade integration in West Africa is signicantly underestimated in ocial trade data. Informal trade data also exhibit a remarkable level of product diversity, with a low product overlap between formal and informal trade. This implies that product diversity in trade is also largely underestimated in the data most often used for trade. Second, we measure a positive semi-elasticity of informality with respect to taris. Increasing taris on a given product by 10% makes it about 12% more likely that this product is imported informally rather than formally. We also nd that non-tari measures also increase informality, with an ad-valorem equivalent of about 21% for SPS measures. Local unprocessed products are more likely to be traded informally. Perishability also associates with informality, suggesting that time as a trade barrier partially aects the choice of informality.
Overall these results indicate that trade barriers play an important role in the preva- Credits for map g. 1: National Geographic Education. A. Trade data: sector distribution at HS2 level Number of products (HS-6 codes) and value share by sector for each country of origin and trading channel, September 2011. Source:
Benin's customs, ECENE survey.
B. Results: exports Table . 3 displays results of the linear probability model for exports. Left-hand side variables dier by country of destination: in the case of Nigeria, we include a binary variable for import bans (columns 1-4). In the case of Togo, in columns 5-8, we include WAEMU's external tari: as for imports from Togo, we allow for the possibility that trade between the two member countries may however face a barrier because of the cost of origin certication, with products without proper certication facing the external tari. For clarity , we report separate estimates for trade to Nigeria, and to Togo. Few variables are signicant. In the Nigeria sample, import bans attract a positive, non-signicant coecient. The interaction between bans and taris is negative, reecting the fact that taris have less impact in the case of products under ban.
However, when controlling for non-tari measures, these variables have a positive impact, and the tari coecient becomes slightly negative (non-signicant). These results are evidently rendered unstable by the small number of observations in formal records, and should be viewed with caution.
43 Note that, in this sample, the indicator 43 In unreported results, we built a sample with formal trade data for a 3-month or yearly period, for unprocessed goods perfectly predicts informality.
In the case of trade with Togo, the tari variable has a positive (non-signicant)
coecients. The only signicant variable is the indicator for unprocessed products, which has a value slightly smaller than for imports. This conrms the prevalence of informality for trade in these local products.
Results from logit and GLM estimations are similar; in the case of logit, the impact of some variables, such as unprocessed goods, cannot be estimated because the outcome does not vary within these categories.
C. Implications for tari revenues
We consider here the implications of our results for the impact of a tari change on tari revenue. Omitting the product index, tari revenues can be written as RT = T:X f with T the ad-valorem tari and X f the value of formal imports for a given product. Our linear specication implies d X inf X f + X inf = :dT =(1 + T )
with our estimate of the tari coecient (since taris enter the specication as ln(1 + T )).
Dierentiating ln RT = ln(T :X f ), and rearranging, one obtains: 
In this equation, the rst term is the impact of a tari change on total trade of the product. It is likely to be smaller than or equal to zero.
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The other two terms correspond to the revenue change due to the tari change itself, and to the change in the share of trade subject to taxation. Note that we assume here, that all formal trade pays the entire taris due; things may get more complex if considering the possibility of evasion (e.g. by underinvoicing or misclassication)
at customs.
combined with the same ECENE data for informal trade. Results are more signicant, and the tari and ban variables have expected signs. However these results are problematic as the period coverage between the two sources diers widely, creating potential issues due to selection and seasonality. We therefore decided not to retain them.
44 The same assumption is made in Fisman and Wei (2004) .
Therefore, a sucient condition for a tari increase to have a negative impact on tari revenues, is that ! X f X f +X i nf : 1+T T .
In the context of this study, two particular cases are of interest, as they are the most frequent in the data: those where X f X f +X i nf is equal to 0 or 1. If there are zero formal imports, then there are zero revenues, and the impact of a tari raise is zero.
At the opposite extreme, when informal trade is zero, then the impact on revenues can very well be positive (provided that total trade does not contract too much):
with at about 1.3, and Benin's taris below 20%, is far smaller than 1+T T , so the sum of the last two terms in equation 14 are positive.
Thus, the implications for revenues dier across products. For products heavily traded on the informal channel, tari increases will not raise additional revenues, as the tax base has already vanished. This concerns in particular products with characteristics which make them prone to informal trade, such as unprocessed, or perishable products. On the other hand, for products which are traded mostly on the formal channel, our estimates suggest that Benin nds itself on the left (i.e., revenue- 46 For example, estimates of the tari elasticity of evasion in Fisman and Wei (2004) , who indirectly observe evasion at customs (with mirror gaps), in the case of trade from Hong-Kong to China, are higher than ours; implying a negative relation between tax revenues and tax rates. However, estimates vary importantly in this literature: for example coecients in Mishra et al. (2008) are much lower.
